The India-China Project

A Nuclear Iran?

2006-04-12T23:35:00.000+05:30

So the Iranians have finally mastered the nuclear fuel cycle at the laboratory level. Is it only a negotiating tactic to make it clear that Iran’s nuclear program cannot be touched or is it a step closer to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons? What options does the US have? Military option has been a hot topic of debate after Seymour Hersh’s article but it is unlikely that a military strike will have the kind of effect the US government is hoping for. It might further accelerate Iran’s advance towards nuclear weapons. History suggests that once political elites in a state make a decision about pursuing nuclear weapons, there is very little the international community can do. The best alternative is to reconcile to limited Iranian uranium enrichment while making sure that effective mechanisms are in place to prevent cheating. All the huffing and puffing notwithstanding, the US and its European partners have little real leverage vis-à-vis Iran in the current global climate, especially as China and Russia are not willing to jeopardize their special relationships with Iran. A nuclear weapon Iran is not in India’s interest, given the complexities of Middle Eastern politics and India’s interests in the region. How far India would be willing to go if the US and its allies decide to get tough with Iran remains to be seen?

A Bird's Eye View of Recent Developments

2006-04-09T23:51:00.000+05:30

Apologies for our long absence but we are back and will try to be more regular. Meanwhile, events have moved at a frantic pace around us. The US President came to India, he saw, and he conquered despite his all time low ratings in his own country. The US-India civilian nuclear energy agreement is generating great excitement in India but continues to be a thorny issue in the US. Despite Condoleezza Rice’s bravura performance in the US Congress last week, it’s far from clear if the deal will get the approval of the US legislature. And Bush Administration, like its other foreign policy fiascos, deserves a lot of blame for doing shoddy work in managing the nitty-gritty of the administrative process. But let’s hope that the larger support for an Indo-US “strategic partnership” will make the deal go through the US Congress.

China, as expected, is going all-out to scuttle the deal, including a diplomatic offensive to block any changes in the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines to make room for India’s needs for dual-use technologies. One can also expect an even greater Sino-Pakistani engagement on sharing dual-use materials, now that the US has made it clear to Pakistan that there is absolutely no possibility of US offering it a deal similar to the Indian one. See Mohan Malik’s piece on Chinese response to the US-India nuclear pact for details. China’s concern for the global non-proliferation is all the more intriguing given its central role in scuttling any serious attempt by the Western powers to deal the Iranian nuclear program in the United Nations Security Council. For the record, however, Iran is not interested in nuclear weapons, as claimed by its United Nations Representative.

China’s President is visiting Washington later this month but the Americans are refusing to describe it as a state visit (Manmohan Singh’s visit to the US last year was a state visit, by the way). Anti-Chinese feelings are rampant in the US these days with the members of the US Congress particularly vociferous on issue of Chinese currency. This is happening at a time when evidence is coming out of increasing domestic dissent on the direction of China’s economic policy. The Chinese elite seems increasingly concerned that the consensus behind two decades of rapid economic growth might be eroding with the resurgence of socialist thinkers critical of the lurch toward capitalism. It would be interesting to see if this debate has some real impact in the coming days or is this merely a tactic by the Communist Party of China to allow critics to let some of their steam off.

Though China is trying hard to woo the Taiwanese, the pandas that it tried to offer as a gift to Taiwan were not accepted. On the other hand, the Dalai Lama's chief negotiator is on his way for the fifth round of talks with China on the future of Tibet and sees the potential in these negotiations to bring about some fundamental shift in China. I guess we will have just to wait and see about that but it is slightly difficult to figure out what exactly justifies such optimism?

As for India’s own neighbourhood, it remains mired in turmoil and religious fanaticism. Despite all the talk of India emerging as a new global player, what about India’s ability to manage the affairs in its own backyard that seem to be spiralling beyond its control? Does the Indian government have a strategy to deal with the chaos in Nepal, religious fanaticism in Bangladesh, or the break-down in the peace process in Sri Lanka? And what about India's obsessive relationship with Pakistan? Where's it going? Does anyone have a clue? Perhaps the Indian government is too busy with the Assembly elections? But it would do well to remember that one nuclear deal does not a great power make.

Chinese demographics - reliable figures?

2006-02-18T20:42:00.000+05:30

Andy Mukherjee of Bloomberg has some interesting comments on the topic of China's demographics, most notably that those figures are also suspect. It could be that the reports of China's aging are somewhat premature.

India and the United States

2006-02-18T20:13:00.000+05:30

Parag Khanna and C. Raja Mohan competently survey the current state of play in the emerging Indo-US relationship. Selfishly, I am pleased to note that most of what I had to say on this topic in 2001 and 2002 (concluding remarks on the subcontinent) has stood the test of time. The ingredient that I missed, and which is yet to establish itself fully, is the convergence between Indian and Chinese growth rates which as reduced the pressure that India feels from China and generally given the Indian state greater room for maneuver.

Falun Gong versus the Chinese State

2006-02-18T19:07:00.000+05:30

Two recent pieces in Forbes detail the ongoing contest between the Falun Gong movement and the Chinese state. The Falun Gong have attempted to use the internet and international phone calls to bolster dissent against the CCP with some success - they claim credit for 7 million CCP members having renounced party membership. In response, the CCP appears to have extended a campaign of violent intimidation to the United States. The persecution of the Falun Gong illustrates, perhaps better than any other single fact, the limits to any propensity to political reform in China.

No Sino-Indian Rapprochment, It's All Containment

2006-02-13T00:24:00.000+05:30

Mohan Malik argues that notwithstanding the recent hype about the improving Sino-Indian relations, “India-China ties remain fragile and as vulnerable as ever to a sudden deterioration. The combination of internal issues of stability and external overlapping spheres of influence forestall the chances for a genuine Sino-Indian rapprochement.” His entire piece can be found here.

Savings and efficiency in India and China - a tipping point in sight?

2006-02-02T19:08:00.000+05:30

The evidence of the last three years is that India's economic growth has moved into a higher bracket, optimistically to something close to 8%. While China's rate of growth, on a large base, is still higher the narrowing of the gap is bringing the strengths of the Indian economy into sharper focus and prompting more detailed comparisons between the two countries. At a very gross level two features stand out: China's investment rate is much higher, and India's utilization of capital is much more efficient. Currently, the first effect is winning but one can wonder (and I would guess) that this cannot last for ever.

Two recent pieces shed light on these matters.

Andy Mukherjee of Bloomberg summarizes a recent Fitch report which discusses why the Chinese save much more (absence of decent returns on savings) and how India's government deficits (dissaving) are at the root of lower investment. Mukherjee himself is not convinced that the Chinese "model" is sustainable as much of the extra investment is channeled into state enterprises.

Separately, Yasheng Huang of MIT revisits his work with Tarun Khanna on the strengths of India's private sector and notes that the intervening two year have been kind to them.

What all of this suggests to the politically minded is that we look for a "tipping point" where India's rising rate of growth edges above a declining rate of growth in China. While this will not redress the actual size of the two economies, it will certainly cause a shift in perceptions of considerable consequence.

LA’FFAIRE IRAN: NO EASY CHOICES FOR INDIA

2006-01-24T17:00:00.000+05:30

Even as the US and the Europeans scramble to put in place a united front vis-a-vis Iran, it’s clear that Iran intends to go all out with its nuclear program. It has not only assumed a belligerent posture over its nuclear program but has also upped the ante on the issue of Israel. The mullahs in Iran seem to be moving to a point of no return with some observers even speculating whether we are witnessing the origins of the next World War. While such sentiments might yet be in a minority, what is undoubtedly clear is that the Iranian regime has decided to test how far they can push the West.

In a way, the West should have been prepared for this showdown. All signs indicated that it was coming one way or another. And yet the US and the Europeans seem to be struggling to come up with a coherent response.

Strategically, it makes sense for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. In a world where states have to fend for their own security, there is no better deterrent than a nuclear weapon. Nuclear weapons may not be popular with the public opinion in the West but all major states that have nuclear weapons know their importance and therefore, have no intention of giving them up. Which states can be more secure than Britain and France today and yet there are no indications that these states want to renounce their nuclear arsenal.Compared to these states, Iran is highly insecure, located as it is in a highly volatile region. Its neighbours, India, Pakistan, and most importantly, Israel have long had nuclear weapons and do not seem to have done too badly for themselves. Moreover, after September 11, 2001 Iran has to contend with the presence of its biggest adversary in its very neighbourhood, with the US straddling Iran from both sides in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is also possible that the one lesson Iran may have learnt from the US invasion of Iraq is that the only way to prevent the US from invading is to acquire nuclear weapons as soon as possible. (Poor Saddam, if he really had nuclear weapons, the US wouldn’t have dared!).

This strategic drive got further strengthened in Iran with the complete collapse of the reformist political parties in the last elections and the election of a hard-liner, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as the President with little or no experience in global politics. He has decided that the only way he can continue to sideline his opponents such as Hashemi Rafsanjani is by adopting an extreme posture vis-à-vis Israel and the Great Satan. And much as the liberals in the West would like to believe otherwise, both these causes are very popular among the Iranian masses. Also, this helps Ahmadinejad to divert attention from a failing economy and soaring rates of unemployment.

So, after calling the Nazis' World War II slaughter of European Jews a "myth" and proclaiming that Israel should be “wiped off the map” or moved to Germany or the US, a conference of holocaust deniers is reportedly being convened by Iran. At the same time, the nuclear program is being used to challenge the US. This seems like a perfect time to take on the US as the Americans seem bogged down in Iraq with the US public having no more stomach for other military adventures. Iran also realizes that it enjoys great leverage in the political and security environment in Iraq and can further intensify its sabotage activities in Iraq if need be.

The global situation is also working in Iran’s favour. The credibility of the US is at an all time low in the comity of nations after the Iraq fiasco. Few states will be willing to place their bets on American pronouncements (or for that matter British) even if they are accompanied by evidence. Russia and China, two states with real leverage vis-à-vis Iran are unlikely to support meaningful sanctions for the fear of hurting their own interests. And so they are continuing to resist American and European efforts to the put the Iranian affair before the United Nations Security Council.

What is surprising is that it took so long for the Europeans to recognize this ploy. For long, all roads have been leading to the Bomb in Tehran and it won’t be long before the mullahs in Iran start brandishing it in the face of the West. And India seems to have got caught in the middle. India has come under pressure as the nature of its decision at the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors could impact its own nuclear negotiations with the US. It remains to be seen if the Indian government decides to repeat its past voting pattern in the IAEA or succumbs to domestic pressure emanating from its coalition partners. If India votes not to report Iran to the Security Council next month, India's own credibility as a stalwart of non-proliferation would be imperilled and the future of the Indo-US nuclear deal would be in serious jeopardy.

Images from the "Rise of China Roundtable" (Report below)

2006-01-21T00:05:00.000+05:30

Bharat Karnad, K. Raghunath and Raja Menon

J. N. Mukhi (left), Ashok Kapur, S.J.S. Chhatwal and S. Kondapalli (center)

Ashok Kapur, S.J.S. Chhatwal and S. Kondapalli

Participants during S. Kondapalli's presentation

Jagat Mehta and Madhuri Sondhi (right)

Participants at closing

Report on MLSIAPA Roundtable on Rise of China

2006-01-18T07:25:00.000+05:30

The ML Sondhi Institute for Asia-Pacific Affairs held a day-long Roundtable on November 12th 2005 on “The Rise of China and its Implications for the Rest of Asia.” We reproduce here the main points made by the chief presenters, Vice-Admiral Raja Menon (retd), Bharat Karnad, Research Professor at the Centre for Policy Research, Professor Ashok Kapur, Waterloo University, Canada and Dr. Srikanth Kondapalli of the Indian Defence Studies Association. The chairs were Shri K. Raghunath, former Foreign Secretary and Shri SJS Chhatwal, former Ambassador.

ADMIRAL K RAJA MENON began by raising two significant questions: first, Can China rise peacefully? and second, Is China rising peacefully?

He proceeded with the argument that from the time of the Romans, Mongols, Ottomans to Napoleon, history has shown that nations do not rise peacefully. Financial centres such as Venice and Amsterdam have been among the few exceptions. But for some reason, not a single nation has risen peacefully towards the upper end of hierarchy. Thus the statistics of history record much bloodshed.

The latest nation to reach the top is the USA, and her ascent is also exceptional in that thanks to the broken economy of Great Britain, her rise did not require direct military intervention. Even so, a certain amount of violence occurred. The post-war rise of Japan and Germany has also been exceptional. After Japan’s defeat, the new Constitution made professional militarism impossible. In Germany although no such constitutional restriction exists, the occupying powers created social conditions that operate against militarism. Besides, the division of Germany and West Germany’s membership in NATO ensured that her growth was not perceived as a threat by the rest of Europe. As a result, though Germany built submarines in the 1980s, none of them were of more than 1000 tons. Thus a kind of unwritten law forbids militarism. If such exceptional conditions exist in China’s case then the peaceful rise argument can be accepted.

Moreover certain nations have reservations about China’s peaceful future, the US for example. South East Asian countries like Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia are not in a position to do anything about the rise of China, peaceful or not, therefore it is the second-tier Asian nations like India, Japan or Vietnam which need to position themselves vis-à-vis China’s growing strength. Even for a country like Japan the ‘peaceful’ rise argument is not credible; and with no professional army and widespread hatred for militarism she has nevertheless started to prepare for the challenge from China’s rise.

With regard to India China has adamantly followed a policy of militarization of Pakistan. CIA reports were to inform Indians about Chinese missile transfers to Pakistan even while the Indian delegates were visiting China. When confronted with the issue, Chinese foreign office delegates dismissed it as something from the past. But as recently as 2004 Pakistan tested its own version of the Chinese world class missile M-9. The Chinese exhibit a tenacious determination to hold down India for at least another twenty-five years.

Admiral Menon advocated clinical analysis of the reasons and purpose behind this Chinese strategy. He pointed out that till the late 1970s, China’s economy was similar to India’s but afterwards China surged ahead. India needs to think about the geopolitical reasons and timings of such policy decisions.

The opacity of the Chinese decision making process also increases suspicions about its foreign policy. The Chinese Foreign Office is definitely not in the inner loop of decision-making in China. The text of Chinese foreign policy does not coincide either with the western school of thought or with the realist philosophy of Morgenthau. Neither of these advocates the conduct of foreign policy on two parallel tracks of economics and geopolitics. Even Clausewitz’s formula of ‘war as foreign policy by other means’ does not seem to be followed by China. But China does use military action to influence diplomatic negotiations.

China is rising as a super power without providing internal freedom to her citizens. In such a situation, with the absence of domestic opposition, irresponsible behaviour on the part of China remains a possibility, unlike in the case of the present superpower, the USA.

With regard to India and China Admiral Menon dismissed any possibility of old civilizational links playing a major role between the two. Despite the presence of Indian influences in Chinese culture, they are loath to acknowledge it.

Against the argument that unless her society becomes dynamic, China will find it difficult to become a superpower, he commented that even a closed society like the erstwhile USSR produced islands of excellence. China may not become a number one power but it can still emerge as a close number two. So India should not underestimate the rise of China.

BHARAT KARNAD:

Mr. Karnad observed that while India follows a Kautilyan foreign policy with her small neighbours, she adopts a linear path with bigger powers. China on the other hand follows a non-linear way of conducting foreign policy with regard to powers bigger than her.

Foreign diplomats in Beijing are mesmerized by the absence of any policy debate in the Chinese media. Moreover, due to the lack of expert Sinologists, India relies on secondary sources for information leading to secondary conclusions about China. Therefore India does not understand China very well, while the Chinese follow a comprehensive strategy of national security and get to know their enemy well.

There is a lack of coordination among the various Indian ministries. The defence ministry relies on the Foreign Office for information while China has an integrated structure and implements her strategies in a methodical fashion.

Mr. Karnad also focused on the changing economics and geopolitics of the Asian region. Quoting from the economic growth forecasts of the BRIC Report, he said that China is headed to become the number one economy in the world while India would be at number three.

Drawing attention to the Chinese nuclear, ICBM and submarine build-up in the region, Mr. Karnad said the situation harks back to Mackinder’s heartland and rim-land notions. China is determined to assert its dominance as the heartland region of Asia while the role of the Pacific islands is only that of a periphery region. India has emerged as the classic balancer but lacks significant matching assets.

In the new genre of politics, nations will be driven by national interest. Therefore a wrong diagnosis of the situation by India would lead to erroneous responses. India should stop behaving like a carom piece flicked about on a board and develop rather, a strategic sense of itself. He emphasized the importance of coming out of the fallacy of the ‘economy first’ attitude and pointed out that India’s accelerating economic growth should be integrated with military expansion which would truly increase her leverage vis-à-vis her friends and adversaries.

He also noted that it is not the lack of resources but wastage which is holding back India. Out of a $13-14 billion defence budget a disproportionately large amount is consumed by the Pakistan factor. Therefore real strategic growth is very weak. India needs an efficient use of available resources to acquire thermo-nuclear power. He suggested a shift from a Pakistan-centric to a China-centric military policy.

To counter the Chinese policy of militarization of Pakistan he supported the use of Tibet card and helping Vietnam to grow as a counter threat to China. He pointed out that in comparison to 1987, our military position vis-à-vis China has actually deteriorated. The Chinese PLA has kept India in the list of possible threats and they are investing heavily in the infrastructure build-up in Tibet. They are also determined to exert their dominance in the Asian heartland through nuclear, missile and submarine build-up. Although China talks about a common interest community its geopolitical architecture indicates otherwise.

He deplored the Indian government’s slowness in understanding the fact that China cannot rise peacefully. A military counter-poise to China is needed in the same way as China has created a proto-adversary for India in the form of Pakistan. To counter this India should build up Vietnam.

The Chinese are admirable for their straight thinking and unsentimental approach in following their national interest: India should do likewise. Our intellectualism and democratic traditions should not come in the way of our national interests.

PROF. ASHOK KAPUR:

In the context of the aims and efforts of the M L Sondhi Institute, Professor Kapur pointed to the need for good institutions to support good negotiation capability.

He appreciated India’s capacity and potential reflected by its participation in the global economy and focused his presentation on ‘What is the China Question?’ He reviewed the various perspectives held on China by Asians abroad and the Western community. For Asians the issue of a peaceful or aggressive China does not hold much relevance. They are influenced by their own military and geopolitical experience with China.

On the other hand the Chinese perceive threats in the post cold war era without a Soviet Union, especially from Taiwan and Japan. Japanese nationalism has become more assertive and military development is under way, linked to China’s notion that the world had become unmanageable. China cannot be expected to follow a policy of peace in isolation within the current international setting. Chinese strategic interests include her relations with the US and the extension of her influence especially in Myanmar and Siberia.

China’s deep strategic interest in South Asia had also been recognized by the USA during the Cold-War days. Pakistan not only helped the Chinese against India but also gave them entry into the Middle-East. When India followed a policy of isolating Myanmar the Chinese utilized it to gain strategic strength in what they hate to call the Indian Ocean. They also have a role in North-East India and Bangladesh. They have a heavy military build-up in Tibet. In fact the Chinese want to emerge as a force to reckon with in the region with India limited to sub-regional power status. The Indian Government has been slow to realize their strategic strength. In the 1990s India’s nuclear test strengthened India’s strategic position and presently China is the only major country which wants India’s denuclearization.

In the Pacific Region the Chinese prefer to keep the American presence as it keeps both Taiwan and Japan in check. However in the post 9/11 world the USA’s policy towards the Pakistan-Chinese alignment has changed but the Chinese have been slow to understand this.

In such a situation, and with regard to China’s internal uncertainties, India should not abandon the Tibet card. It should also monitor Nepal’s situation carefully because in the post-1949 period, the Chinese have used the word ‘peace’ either ambiguously or deceptively. The Chinese believe that with deception they can defeat even the USA so it is not an improbable strategy for dealing with India also.

At the same time an important pattern of Chinese behaviour was reflected in the 1971 war when despite the use of strong language the Chinese hesitated to open a second front against India. The reason given for this was her preoccupation with the Cultural Revolution, but generally the Chinese prefer to put the onus of initiating such action on others. They would rather provide small arms in the North-east than open a second front.

So the answer lies in pro-actively creating a situation rather than only reacting as India did in the case of Pakistan and Myanmar. China should be viewed as a strategic partner, with interests of a Confucian nature and cultural diplomacy veiling a Machiavellian reality.

Answering questions Prof. Kapur elaborated that since India has given up the Tibet card it is now difficult to revive it. Moreover it is also weak internationally as international interest in Tibet is limited. Therefore it does not give any kind of leverage in negotiations. Moreover the Chinese are buying time keeping in mind the growing age of the Dalai Lama. However with regard to China-Nepal relations Tibet still remains a factor. But much would depend up on how the card is played.

On the question of internal democracy and China’s world view, Prof. Kapur said that her world view would depend on what others were doing to China and not on the internal politics of the country. He felt that China is not interested in the resolution of the Korean problem as it would increase the US influence in the region.

S. KONDAPALLI:

Mr. Kondapalli spoke on “The Impact of the Rise of China on Asian Democratization”. His presentation focused on the ‘Threat of China’ and ‘The China Collapse theories.’ The speaker said that a group of twenty scholars under Zheng Bijian, Vice Principal of Central Committee Party School, had been set up dedicated to countering the Rising China Threat and the China Collapse theories. “The Rise of China” is the goal to be pursued for the next twenty years. Through mutual trust the Chinese hope to create a Community of Common Interest in Asia by 2020.

Mr. Kondapalli made an effective slide presentation, highlighting the quantitative aspects of the Chinese rise in the economic field and their presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. He mentioned that it is a rise in terms of comprehensive national power including both the soft and hard factors: economic construction is at the centre of the rise.

Explaining the soft power factors, Mr. Kondapalli mentioned China’s rise as a global manufacturing hub, her seat in the UN Security Council and her global influence.

Economic construction in China occurs under the centrality of the CCP in all spheres, but this underwent a drastic change during Zemin’s period. Besides economic development, opposing the US and ensuring peripheral security indicated by a heavy increase in the defence budget by the late 80s and 90s reflects the stage of building up for the rise of China.

China’s weakness internationally was exemplified during the Iraq War when she failed to shape it according to her own interests. However China will be able to influence global events by 2020 due to her “Rise.” The only uncertainty is whether she will head towards a Soft or a Hard Rise till 2020 after which she will be in a position to use coercive diplomacy like the US.

From the Chinese perspective, the international system is experiencing multiple rises including those of India, Japan, EU, Russia, Brazil and Vietnam which act as stumbling blocks to her ambitions. Now, therefore, China spends more on Diplomatic Missions and Defence.

While talking about the implications of this rise for Asia Kondapalli said that China has increased her policies of good neighbourliness especially in maritime boundary areas, is encouraging economic interdependence and giving a boost to multilateralism through organisations like ASEAN.

While answering questions about whether Vietnam is a stumbling block, Mr. Kondapalli was of the view that with its 80% literacy rate, human resource development, 4-5% economic growth and a history of conflict with China since 15th century; Vietnam has every possibility of emerging as a counter to China. And despite recent talks between the communist parties of the two countries about a possible resolution for their maritime boundary dispute, there is deep suspicion on both sides.

He also noted that in their negotiations over the Himalayan border with India now the Chinese will not talk about exchange of the Eastern and Western sectors for three reasons. Firstly, the sixth Dalai Lama hailed from Tawang which they will now claim as rightfully theirs. Secondly, one-third of Tibet’s trade can be carried through the Tawang tract. And thirdly, for the region from Chumbi Valley to the Tawang tract they have a military plan.

(This report was prepared by the group of Professor Manish Dabhade of JNU.)

Myanmar playing India off against China

2006-01-11T10:46:00.000+05:30

Myanmar is becoming increasingly adept at pitting the interests of its two giant neighbors, India and China, against each other to derive maximum benefits for itself. In a sense, this is par for the course for a small, weak, country that has kept itself out of the regional and international mainstream as deliberate policy but now finds its self-imposed isolation a liability. In opening up to the world, Yangon has seemingly alighted on a two-pronged policy of engaging with China on the economic front and with India in the security sphere (which last caters to the historical wariness the Myanmarese nation have always felt for an imperial or expansionist China). Thus, it has signed an MoU to sell PetroChina 6.5 trillion cubic feet of gas for 30 years from its AI field in which the Indian public sector major ONGC Videsh Ltd holds a 30% stake, thereby ignoring New Delhi's plea to sell it gas to feed the proposed pipeline through Bangladesh into eastern India. Almost simultaneously, the military junta ruling Mynamar, dispatched a missile corvette, UMS Anawyahta, to participate in the Indian Navy's annual 'Milan 2006' exercises with the litttoral South-East Asian navies in the Andaman Sea off Port Blair. This is the first time the Myanmarese Navy has accepted its Indian counterpart's standing invitation to join in the 'Milan' Exercise. It is exected that such participation will hereafter become a regular feature of growing security cooperation.

China’s New Navy

2006-01-04T15:33:00.000+05:30

The latest Congressional Research Service report on the Chinese Navy requires the attention of everyone seriously interested in Asian and global security issues. It describes a new and increasingly powerful force, being created at a very rapid pace, the mission of which is not at all clear.

to read the rest click here.

Banking in China and India

2006-01-04T01:35:00.000+05:30

IASC has posted a richly detailed analysis of banking in China and India by William Gamble which is well worth a read. Gamble compares the China Construction Bank with India's ICICI, both loci of recent foreign investment. His central message is that the political survival of the Chinese Communist Party will, in such matters, trump considerations of economic efficiency while India's private banks face no comparable constraint. He concludes:

So when all is said and done there is no possibility that Chinese state owned banks in general or CCB in particular will ever be profitable. Any full disclosure would most likely reveal that CCB is insolvent. The party is happy to take foreign investors’ money. It is doubtful that they will give it back.

In contrast ICICI is a well run, transparent private company that is subject to both Indian and US economic incentives and disincentives. It holds primary market share in one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The Indian regulatory and legal framework is being reformed, perhaps not as fast as markets would wish, but it is occurring. They also do not need a revolution to change a moribund system. From foreign investors’ stand point, there is very little risk and an enormous potential for profit.

China, India and Demography - Take 2

2006-01-03T23:44:00.000+05:30

In a recent post Harsh Pant pointed to China's demographic constraints and asked what was known about India. In this regard it is useful to look at an analysis by Nicholas Eberstadt whose punch line with regard to India is that while the north (think Bihar) will remain young the south (think Kerala) will not. He notes that this means that the young will come from states with lower socio-economic indicators, especially educational ones. In that last regard, I would like to point to the interesting piece by Sebastian Mallaby which notes that educational progress in India might be underestimated in current projections thanks to market successes. My own, anecdotal, sense is that Mallaby is on to something.

Taiwan applies (rhetorical) brakes

2006-01-03T23:30:00.000+05:30

Of late Taiwan has appeared to be a country only dimly interested in its survival as an independent entity. While China's military buildup across the Taiwan straits has proceeded apace, Taiwan has proceeded with its economic integration with China while ignoring the imperative of building up its own military strength. Popular visits by Kuomintang leaders to the mainland have further fed the impression that more hard-nosed thinking is out of style in Taipei.

The recent speech by President Chen is a departure from this trend. He has re-emphasized the importance of Taiwan's military modernization and of diversifying Taiwan's economic ties. All if this is eminently sensible - it remains to be seen if the island's political system will permit any actual progress on this anytime soon.

The Struggle for Tibet: Is It Destined to Fail?

2006-01-02T00:13:00.000+05:30

The Beijing-sanctioned 11th Panchen Lama in a recent interview claimed that he had been free to pursue his religious practices under the tutelage of the Chinese government. In a blatant attempt to please his Chinese protectors, he went on to claim that the Tibetans are enjoying freedom like never before. Dalai Lama has retorted and, in an attempt to clarify the situation in Tibet, has categorically rejected Panchen Lama’s assertions. He has made it clear that human rights abuses remain the norm in Tibet and Tibetan monks are being tortured and killed by the Chinese authorities. Dalai Lama has spoken with such bitterness towards the Chinese authorities after a long time. For long, he had been hoping that he would be able to bring the Chinese authorities towards some sort of a compromise position. But he has failed and China has continued with its repressive policies towards the Tibetans. The political struggle of Tibetan Buddhism is at a crossroads as life after the Dalai Lama remains highly uncertain even as the pace of immigration of Han Chinese is bound to go up even further with the opening of a railway linking central Tibet with China. Despite four rounds of talks between the Dalai Lama's representatives and Chinese officials since 2002, nothing concrete has emerged and China seems to be merely buying time. With China being seen as the next superpower, the international community also seems to be forgetting the struggle in Tibet. Are Tibetans on the wrong side of history?

The Myth of an Emerging Asian Community

2005-12-21T21:23:00.000+05:30

The recent East Asian Summit had generated a lot of hype about it being a precursor to a larger East Asian community, something in the mould an Asian “European Union.” But as Dr Mohan Malik of the Asia-Pacific Center forSecurity Studies in Honolulu points out, major powers in Asia are yet to reconcile differences among themselves. And so long as this does not happen, there will be little movement towards any kind of greater Asian Union. India’s growing profile is worrying China while Sino-Japanese relations are at an all time low. This does not augur well for the future of Asia.

Oil Diplomacy or Mere Hyperbole: Is India In For Another Disappointment?

2005-12-08T10:34:00.000+05:30

China is aggressively working to satisfy its energy requirements for the future. Just a few months back in a daring move, one of China’s largest state-controlled oil companies, the China National Offshore Corporation (CNOOC), made a $18.5 billion unsolicited bid for the American oil company Unocal. Though the bid ultimately failed, it created panic in the US political circles as the offer by CNOOC was viewed as the latest symbol of China’s growing economic prowess and of the soaring ambitions of its corporate giants, especially when it comes to the energy resources it needs desperately to continue feeding its rapid growth. China is actively seeking to loosen the grip of the US on world energy resources and secure the fuel it needs to keep its economy in overdrive. Energy deal-making, from Iran and Sudan to the shores of the Caspian Sea, has been the center-piece of China’s foreign policy for the last few years. Chinese President, Hu Jintao, has traveled to Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa on missions focused largely on securing energy supplies that will not pass through American or European companies before reaching China.

Last year China passed Japan to become the world’s second-largest importer of oil, after the United States. Its booming but grossly inefficient economy consumes three times as much energy per dollar of output than the world average. Beijing has grown increasingly wary of depending heavily on imports when it companies do not control major reserves abroad and its navy does not patrol the sea lanes through which these supplies must pass to reach China’s ports. China’s foreign policy is being transformed by its energy needs and a major competition with the US for resources is in the offing.

Recent Indian attempts notwithstanding, China has clearly left India far behind in so far as its international diplomacy in the energy realm is concerned. India’s Oil Minister, Mani Shankar Aiyar now wants to pursue the oil diplomacy equivalent of Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai. He believes that India and China will benefit greatly if they cooperate across a range of matters relating to hydrocarbons value chain and calls this Sino-Indian alliance a “21st century silk route.” Of course, cooperation in the oil sector will benefit both but will the Chinese cooperate in good faith? Chinese state oil giants have so far had an edge over their Indian counterparts in the search for energy resources because of a head start and deeper pockets. They've beaten Indian rivals in the race for some blocks in Angola, Myanmar, and Indonesia. Despite all the talk of Sino-Indian cooperation on energy security, there is an almost equal likelihood of the two sides competing aggressively as their energy demands surge in the coming years. The Chinese government has been notably silent on all the hyperbole surrounding possible Sino-Indian cooperation in the energy sector. Instead of India putting all its eggs in the Chinese basket, it would make much more strategic sense for India to cooperate with China if and when desirable, and yet be ready for competition which is likely to emerge sooner than later.

Fearing Indo-US Convergence, China Spying on India

2005-12-02T13:10:00.000+05:30

An interesting report points out recent attempts by China to undertake extensive espionage on India’s external interests. Chinese unease is being fueled by the growing Indo-US convergence in recent times. China has openly criticized the recently signed Indo-US nuclear agreement and has tried to present itself as the great votary of nuclear non-proliferation. After doing its utmost to cripple the nuclear non-proliferation regime by helping all kinds of regimes in their nuclear weapons programs, China is now worried that India might just get some benefits for being an exemplary nuclear power. China has always tried to restrict India as a regional power and is now concerned about India’s rising global profile. A muscular Indian foreign policy is not in China’s interests and it is with this in mind that China is trying to get into the inner-workings of the Indian foreign policy establishment. The Indian government should formulate a clear-eyed China policy and cease from mollycoddling China. And one hopes that the Indian intelligence agencies are also paying the Chinese back in the same coin.

China Faces Demographic Constraints

2005-12-02T12:53:00.000+05:30

China’s stellar economic growth in recent years, more often than not, blinds us to the constraints that have begun to emerge in the country. A recent article focuses on the demographic constraint that China faces in the coming years. It points out that till recently, China was one of the world’s most youthful countries, with a median age of 20. By 2050 China’s median age could be 45 compared to 41 for the US. And older countries are not good at radical innovation that’s the driving force being today’s economic miracles. Moreover, China is also confronting an extraordinary demographic imbalance as there are now about 120 boys for every 100 girls in China. To counter this China will either have to attract large-scale female immigration or else it may have to face the loss of many of its young men. China will have to plan its future accordingly. However, will India’s case be any different? Is India even thinking about such potential constraints on its own economic development?

North Korea and American Isolationism

2005-12-01T20:07:00.000+05:30

The remaining two members of the "Axis of Evil" are slow motion crises with the potential to come to boil sooner or later. The essential question is whether the United States, with support from Europe and Japan, can succeed in forcing Iran and North Korea to swear off nuclear weapons without resorting to war. Today, in the wake of Iraq, it seems unlikely that the US can credibly threaten to resort to war absent a clear casus belli - there isn't the domestic consensus for it. In the case of North Korea, the costs of a war could be very heavy for South Korea and there seems to be little appetite there for a confrontational policy. Neither is it likely that China would wink at a major conflict with its long time client.

Boxed in by these constraints the US has had to resort to trading favors for North Korean cooperation. While a breakthrough was heralded in the September 19th six-party talks statement, the sceptics have seen it is as another North Korean success in trading nothing for something. Nicholas Eberstadt of the AEI is a long time North Korea watcher and sceptic and what he has to say on the matter is worth reading.

One of this central points is that North Korea's strategic goal is untangling the US-South Korean alliance:

Washington initially resisted the DPRK's surreal proposal for an international acceptance of peaceful North Korean nuclear power. Once the Chinese and South Korean governments indicated that they were prepared to endorse this fiction, however, the U.S. government signed on, too. As to the endorsed goal of . . . verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, this formula conjoins the objective of dismantling the North's nukes with the notion of making South Korea nuke-free. But since the latter has never made nuclear weapons--and since all U.S. nuclear weapons were removed from there fifteen years ago--how is the corollary to work?

Pyongyang's rhetorical syllogism depends entirely upon the existence of the U.S.-Seoul military alliance. So long as the United States is treaty-bound to South Korea's defense, Pyongyang maintains that any and all means of American security protections--including nuclear guarantees--naturally cover the South. In this logic, the only way by which the southern portion of the Korean peninsula can be denuclearized is by severing the U.S.-South Korean military alliance, by withdrawing all U.S. forces from South Korea, and by leaving South Korea outside the U.S. security perimeter (as it seemed to be in early 1950).

It seems not unreasonable to wonder whether two years from now if the sceptics turn out to be right, whether the conjunction of American exasperation and South Korean anti-Americanism might not precipitate such an outcome? For evidence of rising isolationist sentiment in the US see here.

This is the general danger to Asia from significant foreign policy reversals for the US - an isolationist turn which would leave the task of balancing China much more in the inexperienced hands of the natives.

Judicial Review in India and China

2005-11-29T07:05:00.000+05:30

Today's New York Times reports on the end of a minor insurrection in which a Chinese judge attempted to invalidate a local law on the grounds that it contravened a national law. I think it is fair to say that it didn't quite make it to the level of a Chinese Marbury vs Madison - she failed to get her reasoning written into law. The contrast with the Indian situation, where since the 1967 decision in Golak Nath vs State of Punjab the Supreme Court has held that even constitutional amendments are justiciable is striking.

PS: A reader asked for an explanation of Golak Nath. Here goes:

Following a slew of constitutional amendments, passed by Parliament, the Indian Supreme Court first articulated, in this case, the position that some aspects of the constitution could not be amended by Parliament (even with the specified procedure) if they tampered with the basis structure envisaged by the founders. The actual judicial history is somewhat complicated and is discussed here but the bottom line is the Indian Supreme Court not only gets to decide the constitutional status of laws but that of constitutional amendments themselves which is a significant check on legislative power. In this sense the Indian Court is perhaps the most powerful court in the world.

Harbin and China's Environment

2005-11-29T06:55:00.000+05:30

Writing in the aftermath of the Harbin disaster, Elizabeth Economy of the Council on Foreign Relations paints a grim picture of China's environmental problems . She argues that:

It is easy to blame China's rapid economic growth for this devastating situation. Scant attention has been paid to the costs of pollution or resource degradation engendered by this dramatic economic development. Central government investment in environmental protection remains well below the 2.2% of GDP Chinese scientists claim is the minimum necessary to prevent further deterioration. Pollution fines are so low that factories often elect to pay them rather than take corrective measures. Water is typically priced far below replacement cost, discouraging recycling or conservation.

Fault, however, also rests deep within China's political system. While officials in Beijing routinely pass laws to protect the environment, local officials and factory managers collude to evade them. Many enterprises and municipalities are so confident in their ability to ignore the law that even when they possess appropriate waste-treatment facilities, they elect not to use them in order to avoid operational costs. Local environmental protection bureaus and courts are also beholden to local governments rather than to central government agencies, making them particularly susceptible to political and economic pressure. With few incentives for factory managers and local officials to do the right thing and even fewer disincentives to do the wrong thing, environmental officials face an uphill battle.

Sadly, this does not, prima facie, sound that different from India. If readers are aware of any quantitative environmental assessments of the two countries, please let us know.

Blogs and China

2005-11-26T22:01:00.000+05:30

China's government is locked in an ongoing contest with advances in information technology. At issue is whether these advances have the effect of enhancing freedom of expression or whether they can be turned around to efficiently regulate expression. A New York Times story on blogging in China indicates that the proliferation of blogs is leading to the loosening of social restraints as well as political ones. Especially notable is this passage:

A leading practitioner of the sly, satirical style that is emerging here as an influential form of political and social commentary is a 38-year-old Beijing entertainment journalist named Wang Xiaofeng. Mr. Wang, who runs a site called Massage Milk, is better known to bloggers by his nickname, Dai San Ge Biao, which means Wears Three Watches.

His blog mixes an infectious cleverness with increasingly forthright commentary on current events, starting with his very nickname, which is a patent mockery of the political theory of the former Chinese Communist Party chief Jiang Zemin, which was labeled San Ge Dai Biao, or the Three Represents.

In a recent commentary, as the government stoked patriotic sentiment during the commemoration of the defeat of the Japanese in World War II, Mr. Wang asked who really fought the enemy, making the provocative observation that only two Communist generals had died fighting Japan, while more than 100 of their Nationalist counterparts had.

"In blogging I don't need to be concerned about taboos," Mr. Wang said. "I don't need to borrow a euphemism to express myself. I can do it more directly, using the exact word I want to, so it feels a lot freer."

We'll have to see how long Wang gets to express such sentiments. The point that the Communists barely fought the Japanese is particularly incendiary as it cuts at the roots of the story the regime tells about itself. The recent Mao biography by Chang and Halliday documents the lack of Communist resistance to the Japanese at some length - turning on its head the long retailed myth of Mao's nationalism.

Assessing Chinese Debates

2005-11-26T04:51:00.000+05:30

Srikanth Kondapalli is one of India’s leading experts on China. He is a Research Fellow at the Insitute of Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi and the author of China's Military: The PLA in Transition, China's Naval Power, The People's Liberation Army: Evolving Dynamics and A Great Leap Forward Modernisation. Earlier this year he took part in the first biennial conference of the World Forum on Democratization in Taipei. In his presentation “The Rise of China & Implications to Asia” which is available here, he surveyed the Chinese discussion on the prospects for its rise, its democratic prospects and military modernization. In his conclusions he notes that:

China, as stated above, has argued that it is opposed to hegemonism and power politics and also the threat or use of force in international relations and advocates the settlement of international disputes through peaceful means. Laudatory as these statements are and, if implemented sincerely by China or other countries most of the conflicts that afflict the world could be resolved. Nevertheless, the track record of China in this regard is inconsistent and contradictory, if not suspect. Several examples may be cited regarding the threat or use of force by China to solve disputes. While China argues that resolving the Taiwan issue is its internal matter, in the age of globalization, it is difficult to conceive of a subject as purely internal, especially as armed preparations are being made to resolve issues. The 1995-96 events are a pointer that many countries of the region may be affected in terms of trade, shipping, insurance, stock exchange and environmental security.
China’s stance on the South China Sea dispute, likewise, is contradictory and intrusive. While China has stated that it is ready to postpone the settlement of the sovereignty dispute, this, nevertheless, did not prevent it from employing its naval forces in interfering constantly in the region as the Philippine Navy has pointed out. Vietnam is wary of Chinese intentions and capabilities as well in the Paracels, though it has signed an agreement on the Gulf of Tonking issue and is willing to work with China.
China’s threat of use of force during the Indo-Pakistan conflicts of 1965, 1971, 1999 is well recorded. China’s arms sales to several countries in South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East, though on a smaller scale as compared to other countries, are detrimental to regional stability. Continuing transfers of weapons of mass destruction or technologies from China to Pakistan or other countries, has not only exposed Chinese claims to be a “responsible” rising power but has also raised concerns among neighboring countries. Its arms sales to both the warring states of Iran and Iraq at the same time during the 1970s are inexplicable and opportunistic. This has been the context for the growing suspicions of its neighboring countries about the nature and dynamics of the Chinese defense sector and also the launch of the “good neighbor” policy, the sincere implementation of which will be watched closely by all concerned neighbours.

I should also note that our colleague Arthur Waldron delivered a keynote address at this important conference.

Bush Challenges China on Political and Religious Freedoms: But Does He Have an Asia Strategy?

2005-11-21T13:35:00.000+05:30

With the visit of the US President to Asia, the US is once again trying tograpple with the momentous transformation that has taken place in globalpolitics in the last few years. The locus of international politics hasvirtually shifted from Europe to Asia and the President’s 4-nation tour of Asia is an acknowledgement of this reality. His visit comes at a time when the Bush Administration is trying to carve out a coherent strategy for Asia.

The underlying thrust for this recasting of US security strategy for Asia iscoming from China’s phenomenal rise as a global economic and political power inthe last few decades. China’s extraordinary rates of economic growth have givenit the ability to modernize its military rapidly. As a consequence, the balanceof power is Asia has undergone a radical transformation in the last few yearsand has given rise to new regional tensions. The emerging Sino-Japanese tensions are just one of its manifestations. Despite growing economic tiesbetween China and Japan, Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations are at an all timelow. A range of political and territorial disputes have plunged relationsbetween Asia’s two biggest powers to a historic low.

Japan has made it clear that it considers China a potential military threat thatwould have to be faced and countered in the coming years. This was followed byJapan’s announcement that a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue is astrategic objective that it shares with the United States, signaling to China that it might help America defend Taiwan in the event of a war. For its part,China has strongly opposed Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of theUnited Nations Security Council on the grounds that Japan has failed to show sufficient contrition for its wartime atrocities. But the real reason might bereluctance on the part of China to view Japan as global power on par withitself.

During the recent visit of the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld to Japan,the US and Japan signed a major mutual-security agreement that will lead to anew security architecture in Asia-Pacific. The ultimate aim of the recent agreement is to help Japan became more able to counter a range of threats toits security. Towards this end, a closer US-Japan military cooperation isenvisioned, including the basing of an American nuclear-powered naval vessel ina Japanese port. During his visit President Bush also emphasized America's closepolitical, economic, and security ties with Japan and made it a point tochallenge China on its record on democracy. He went to the extent of suggesting that China should emulate the democratic progress of Taiwan.

There were no major breakthroughs in Sino-US relations during the recent visit as was expected. But the trip clearly revealed the evolving US strategy towards Asia.Even as the US continues to engage China economically, it is becoming wary of China's authoritarian character and rising military prowess. The US Secretary of Defense has already openly questioned double-digit percentage increases in Chinese military spending. But US policymakers have come to accept China's rising economic and political profile as a fact that the US must learn to manage rather than openly challenge. And the US is trying to manage China's rise by cultivating other allies in the region.

It is in this context that India's role becomes much more significant. The strategic environment that had constrained Indo-US ties in the past from achieving their full potential is now an enabling factor, as Indo-US ties are at an all-time high. Whether India likes it or not, India’s role is set to become the determining factor in shaping the security environment of Asia in the next few decades. It remains to be seen if the Indian government is capable of taking on this challenge.

Iraq and Vietnam

2005-11-21T08:33:00.000+05:30

The events of the past few days in the United States Congress have sharpened the sense that the steady erosion of support for the US presence in Iraq is starting to bite. Naturally, this brings up visions of Vietnam.

The two conflicts are, of course, quite different in their details. In Iraq the US faces an insurgency with private support but not a conventional foe with support from major states as it did in Vietnam. One commonality though is the common initial failure to focus on building up local regimes with sufficient independence to fight for their own survival---in both cases this was a political failure above all.

At any rate the history of the second half of the Vietnam conflict – the failed “Vietnamization” strategy, is now again of interest for any lessons it might contain for the current building up of the post-Saddam Iraqi state. Nixon then Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird has weighed in to argue that Vietnamization failed only because the US Congress deserted South Vietnam while the Soviets and the Chinese kept arming the North. Two recent articles (here and here) by Richard Miniter examine the Vietnam-Iraq parallels in some detail and argue also that there are no real lessons to be learned, the insistence of the media notwithstanding. These articles build on a study by Jeffrey Record and W. Andrew Terrill last year.

There is though the important aspect that Iraq still has to solve the problem of reconciling the Sunnis to (democratic) Shia power – a challenge with no real parallel in Vietnam either. While continued American support is essential to the emergence of a new Iraq, a crucial ingredient will have to come from the Iraqis themselves.

It is scarcely necessary to note that the future of Iraq is of considerable importance to India. A triumph for the insurgency there would be viewed as a triumph for Al Qaeda worldwide and can only fan flames close home that India would be better off without. For that matter the fall of Saigon inaugurated an era of Soviet adventurism that led to Afghanistan and, eventually, to much trouble for India in its own neighborhood.

The Indo-US Convergence

2005-11-19T22:15:00.000+05:30

Ashley Tellis has played a key role in the Bush Administration's major inititiative on India. In this testimony before the Committee on International Relations of the US House of Representatives he lays out elegantly and powerfully the intellectual rationale for this development. This is in the context of hearings on the proposed US-India nuclear deal initialled during Prime Minister Singh's recent Washington visit. His basic, completely correct, argument is that the United States would be better off if Asia's rise involved a democratic and liberal India as a significant force regardless of whether India actually becomes a close ally. However, the piece (not too long) is worth a full read.

Indians and Indian-Americans who share a socially fashionable disdain for the Bush Adminstration should compare Tellis's position with that of the New York Times editorial page which seems blissfully unaware that Chinese military spending has been growing at a torrid pace for a period longer than the Times has had Mr. Bush in its crosshairs.

MLSIAPA activities

2005-11-18T06:55:00.000+05:30

The last week has seen two seminars involving the MLSIAPA.

The first, The Rise of China and its Implications for the Rest of Asia was held on November 12th at the India International Center, New Delhi and was organized by the MLSIAPA. Our colleagues Bharat Karnad and Ashok Kapur took part along with a group of distinguished experts. We will post a fuller account soon.

The second, Regional and Global Terrorist Threats: The Way Out was held by the Centre for Research into Rural and Industrial Development in Chandigarh and the Kurginyan Centre of Moscow in association with the Professor ML Sondhi Memorial Committee, November 8th to 10th. The seminar was formally inaugurated by the Prime Minister of India on November 9th, and also addressed by the Chief Ministers and Governors of Punjab and Haryana.

It witnessed lively interactions between Russian, Israeli, Pakistani, Nepalese and Indian delegates, reflecting their divergent encounters with terror and the lack of a comprehensive and universal definition of terrorism. Although the guests were comfortable with the working definition of terrorism at the use of violence against innocent civilians for political or other ends, the Indian legal representative pointed out that the UN had many suggested definitions none of which were yet regarded as definitive. Hence it was not possible to evolve a legal response to the phenomenon, which remained open to multiple interpretations.

A critique was also offered of the ‘global’ war on terror: it was pointed out that the causes of terrorism are always local. The Sri Lankan Tamils, the Palestinians, the Nepalese Maoists and the IRA are responding to problems born out of local particularities and in that sense terrorism is not a global phenomenon. But it was counter-argued that operationally all terrorist groups are now interconnected if not mutually supportive, and that global or international cooperation was necessary to cope with these challenges. However with the complexity of the interconnected world, various paradoxical situations arise such as the USA’s alliances with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan – the one the financier and possibly central director of many Islamic terrorist groups, and the other the training ground for terrorists who fan into all quarters of the globe.

The seminar ended with a resolution to continue the discussion on the regional and global manifestations of terrorism by the concerned institutions, by agreeing to meet at periodic intervals on a regular basis.

Border Talks: From Tawang to the Indian Ocean

2005-11-18T06:05:00.000+05:30

The Tribune has a report on the India-China border talks which presumably reflects a leak from the Indian side either intended to stiffen India's negotiating at the talks or simply to dampen expectations that anything might emerge from them.

At any rate the report indicates a fairly wide set of strategic disagreements. It says, in part:

The Sino-Indian border issue has entered the real phase. Two separate compartments, which will complement each other eventually, have become discernible.

One is the actual border demarcation. In the Chinese concept, the border length still remain, 2,000 km, while in the Indian concept, it is about 4,000 km. Tawang is repeatedly claimed, as the 6th Dalai Lama was born there. That is just one.

Other big issues include security of the Indian Ocean sea-lanes for their energy security as 70 per cent of China's oil imports traverse the Indian Ocean route. Chinese missiles cover these routes, and its navy will soon be flying its flag permanently in the Indian Ocean. On this issue China will not countenance any Indian resistance.

From the greater regional and global perspective, Beijing has put New Delhi's new active foreign policy under a microscope. How does India's growing military capabilities supplement its foreign policy objectives and can impact China's controlling interests in greater Asia. The Indian Navy's exercises with the US Navy, on the one side, and with Southeast Asian navies in China's backyard have raised eyebrows in Zhongnanhai.

What all of this suggests is, as one should expect, that as Chinese capabilities grow strategic friction will be spread over a larger set of issues. In response India will have to boost its capabilities with a much more specific focus on China. Historically, Indian defense spending has been disproportionately Pakistan-centric and so this correction will require some renegotiation of priorities between and within the services.

Readers interested in looking at maps of the disputed areas can find them here (western sector) and here (eastern sector). Tawang can be seen on the latter.

USCC issues 2005 report

2005-11-15T19:34:00.000+05:30

The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission was created by the United States Congress in 2000 to monitor, investigate, and submit to congress an annual report on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and to provide recommendations, where appropriate, to Congress for legislative and administrative action. For more background on the commission see here.

I would be remiss if I did not note that our colleague Arthur Waldron has served a two year term on the commission.

Last week the commission released its annual report for 2005. The report adds to the general and growing unease in the US about Chinese power and intentions which we have discussed often on these pages and also bemoans the lack of a clear national strategy on the part of the United States. Among its specific concerns I was interested to see the rising worry about the difficulties of defending Taiwan and the recognition that the altered global energy landscape creates more stress. On the former, the recommendation that senior US military personnel be permitted to visit Taiwan to better plan for conflictual contingencies, seems eminently sensible. The current situation where there is significant sentiment in both Taiwan and the United States that the other is not serious about Taiwan's defense is not conducive to maintaining the status quo. On the latter, there is evidence that Chinaitselff needs to get real about energy prices as discussed here by James Hamilton.

India to consume her way to greatness

2005-11-10T19:41:00.000+05:30

Stephen Roach, Chief Economist of Morgan Stanley, is generally a pessimist. In the past he was often warned of trouble for the US and has been less than impressed with the impact of information technology. But he is all for the Indian consumer who he expects to power a more robust economic growth in India and globally. In discussions of India verus China, this is certainly a comparison that has not received much attention before.

China's Quest For European Military Technology

2005-11-10T19:33:00.000+05:30

John Tkacik argues in the Wall Street Journal that China's quest for arms from Europe has run into serious trouble with changes in Germany, troubles in France and increased American vigilance.

For a more "bottom-up" view of what is at stake see this report from the Jamestown Foundation on China's attempts to acquire military technology from the Czech Republic.

Social unrest in China

2005-11-10T19:15:00.000+05:30

Writing in the Financial Times (November 6th) Minxin Pei has some interesting numbers on social unrest in China:

When Chinese leaders visit foreign capitals, they usually bask in the glow of the supercharged economic growth China has sustained for the last quarter-century. But there is another growth story they prefer not to advertise: social unrest. Measured by various indicators, social tensions in China have risen to record levels. The number of so-called “mass incidents” (sit-ins, riots, strikes and demonstrations) reached 74,000 in 2004, an all-time high, and involved about 3.7m individuals. In 1994, by comparison, there were about 10,000 such incidents, with 730,000 participants. The number is rising. Already this year, the number of petitioners to the central government, a reliable barometer of social tensions in the provinces, has reached a new high.

China Opposes Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Surprised, Anyone?

2005-11-04T11:41:00.000+05:30

China is now openly criticizing the recently signed Indo-US nuclear agreement and trying to present itself as the great votary of nuclear non-proliferation. After doing its utmost to cripple the nuclear non-proliferation regime by helping all kinds of regimes in their nuclear weapons programs, China is now worried that India might just get some benefits for being an exemplary nuclear power. China had one of the most irresponsible nuclear powers and has supported states such as Pakistan and Iran in their nuclear aspirations despite its obligations under the NPT. China’s policy has been to “work against American counter-proliferation policy until get caught, then deny charges, only to subsequently, and much belatedly, recant to say that it will not happen again.”

India has never been a party to the NPT and despite this it has a great record in non-proliferation. It is this responsible behavior that the US wants to acknowledge with the new nuclear pact with India. China’s reaction is a sign of nervousness at the newfound acceptance of India’s nuclear status in the international community. It is also interesting to note that while China is upping the ante in opposing the Indo-US nuclear deal, the Communist parties in India are also hell-bent on destroying the upward trajectory in Indo-US relations, going to an extent of opposing Indo-US military exercises.

China has over the years done its best to maintain a rough balance of power in Indian subcontinent by preventing India from gaining an upper hand over Pakistan. It has consistently assisted Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs to counterbalance India’s development of new weapons systems. India’s preoccupation with Pakistan reduces India to the level of a regional power while China can claim the status of an Asian and world power. China remains the only major power in the world that refuses to discuss nuclear issues with India for fear that this might imply a de facto recognition of India’s status as a nuclear power. It continues to insist on the sanctity of the UN resolution 1172 which calls for India (and Pakistan) to give up its nuclear weapons program and join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state.

The Indian government should keep this in mind while formulating its policies towards China. But does India have a China policy?

Two Views on China's Rise: Prestowitz and Fishman

2005-10-31T10:34:00.000+05:30

The rise of China as a major global economic and political player is garnering a lot of scholarly and policy attention, especially in the US. Irrespective of whether China is fudging some of its official economic data, China’s growth rates are creating a dynamic that is bound to have long-term implications. Two recent books examine China’s economic rise in detail with a focus on its implications for the West. Both in their distinct ways are sounding a wake-up call to the US to face the reality that it is slowly, but steadily, losing its economic dominance. It remains to be seen if their analyses will stand the test of time.

Reform bottlenecks in India

2005-10-30T20:03:00.000+05:30

The Economist notes that India's communists have learned nothing and forgotten nothing - oddly, unlike their Chinese heroes.

Chinese economic statistics

2005-10-30T19:53:00.000+05:30

There has been much commentary on whether China's official GDP growth figures are accurate. James Hamilton points to some contradictions in the official data. See also his link to a discussion of China's FDI figures.

IISS estimates Chinese defense spending is much higher than official figures

2005-10-27T18:05:00.000+05:30

London's IISS has put out this year's Military Balance. As the Financial Times reports, it pegs China's defence budget last year at $62.5 billion, which is more than twice the official figure of $25 billion. The IISS also estimates a 10% annual growth rate over the past ten years. The magic of compound interest, as they say.

India-China border negotiations going nowhere?

2005-10-27T01:02:00.000+05:30

Srikanth Kondapalli hints that the changing strategic scenario in Tibet, thank to the near completion of the new railway, may be making China harden its stance in the interminable border negotiations. Not really suprising, is it?

China makes a move in Nepal

2005-10-27T00:46:00.000+05:30

Few relationships are as misunderstood outside the parties involved as the Indo-Chinese rivalry. This became clear after the 1998 Pokhran II tests when most of the global reaction consisted of incredulity that India would invoke China's hostility as an explanation for going nuclear. Readers interested in getting a better handle on this could do no better than read John Garver's excellent 2001 study Protracted Contest whose introductory chapter is, luckily, available on the web free of charge.

Garver's title captures nicely the dynamics of the relationship. In particular Garver chronicles the constant friction over China's presence in South Asia. Over the last decade India's democratic sensitivities allowed China to dramatically increase its presence in Myanmar during the initial segment of the Aung-San Suu Kyi saga when India was attempting to isolate the junta. A recent report on Chinese military aid to Nepal suggests that the same dilemma is now recurring in a much more important neighbor.

Rumsfeld Visits China, Returns Unimpressed

2005-10-26T09:28:00.000+05:30

Donald Rumsfeld’s recent visit to China was significant in many respects. It was not only his first visit to China as part of the Bush Administration but it also brought into sharp relief the US-China tensions as China continues with its military modernization. Rumsfeld has been a persistent critic of China’s military behavior. He has raised the question of Chinese intentions at a security conference in Singapore a few months back and he returned to this theme again arguing that a rapid and secretive Chinese military buildup, raised questions about "whether China will make the right choices, choices that will serve the world's real interests in regional peace and stability." This is despite the fact that Rumsfeld became the first US Defense Secretary to visit the headquarters of the People's Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps (SAC), China's strategic missile command.

According to the Pentagon's latest report on Chinese combat capabilities, "current trends in China's military modernization could provide China with a force capable of prosecuting a range of military operations in Asia - well beyond Taiwan - potentially posing a credible threat to modern militaries operating in the region." The debate over China's military power and the purported need for a major US buildup to counter China's recent arms acquisitions is bound to become increasingly heated in the months and years to come and India will also be forced to negotiate its way between an America trying to preserve its military supremacy and an increasingly aggressive China. India's own military modernization should also take into account the opacity surrounding the military build-up of China.

More on the White Paper

2005-10-25T05:26:00.000+05:30

The Hindu (October 21st) carries a report on the White Paper issued by the Information Office of the State Council on China’s “socialist political democracy”. It declares a marriage between Marx’s ‘theory of democracy’ and the ‘reality of China’, assimilating the ‘useful political achievements of mankind including western democracy’ and the ‘democratic elements of China’s traditional culture and institutional civilization.’ This ill-assorted jumble of catchphrases full of internal contradictions is no doubt meant to quieten those voices either harp critically on human rights transgressions in the Middle Kingdom or predict a future for (genuine) democracy in China – perish the thought!

Soon enough after this preamble, we read of people’s democracy led by the CPC in which the ‘overwhelming majority of the people act as masters of state affairs with democratic centralism as the basic organisational principle and mode of operation.’ Such might well be shrugged off as quaint Orwellian archaisms if it were not that regime apologists or investors in China might well gratefully swallow this humbug as ‘evidence’ of her democratic intentions against those tiresome reminders of Tiananmen Square, Falun Gong, or whistle-blowers on lethal pandemics originating in the unsanitary conditions prevailing in the countryside. As the report proceeds the language gets more confident and fundamentalist, moving to the ‘people’s democratic dictatorship’ which ‘pools all the correct opinions’ and where decisions are made collectively!
The sting is in the tail, “We are against democracy for all”.

The CCP defines democracy (away)

2005-10-24T20:42:00.000+05:30

The Chinese government has issued a "white paper" on democracy. The Wall Street Journal Asia) comments that:

It is an ironclad rule that if someone qualifies the word democracy he is talking about the absence of it. So when the Chinese Communist Party issues a white paper on the evolution of "Socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics" it is talking about anything but.

The document itself asserts that:

The building of political democracy with Chinese characteristics is progressing with the times, exhibiting great vigor and vitality.

I think the Journal has the better of the argument and is correct in noting that this reflects the increased pressure felt by the CCP to explain why freedom should not go along with prosperity. That they feel such a pressure is surely a good thing.

The US-China Conversation

2005-10-17T06:59:00.000+05:30

Two recent news stories highlight the ambivalence afflicting the Bush Administration in its dealings with China. The first report points made by Robert Zoellick and his team in an ongoing strategic dialog with China - the message here is that China must become a great deal more transparent if it expects to defuse anxieties about its growing power. The second report describes an ongoing dialog on economic issues where the United States is asking for fairly detailed changed in the management of China's economy in order to produce a more balanced regime of economic relations. So there you have it: at one end a rising security anxiety and at the other end an increasingly intimate economic relationship. The contrast with the Cold War is striking.

Brzezinski versus Mearsheimer: Take II

2005-10-14T23:56:00.000+05:30

Previously I pointed to a debate between Brzezinski and Mearsheimer on the prospects for a "peaceful rise" for China. Now, for some comments on that discussion.

Mearsheimer's central thesis, spelled out at great length in his The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (for a review by yours truly see here), is that the behavior of great powers is explained over the course of modern history by their desire to achieve continental hegemony and to keep others from doing so in their own regions. Of all great powers only the United States has actually succeeded but others have tried (e.g. Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia) and China will try as soon as the means come within reach.

Brzezinski's counter is not in terms of an alternative theory, but instead has the realism (small r) of the practioner. In his analysis one finds the following claims;
a) Theory in international relations is not theory in Physics (if I may paraphrase him)
b) China's leadership consists of very smart people who've already read Mearsheimer's book
c) They know that they cannot challenge the United States for a very long time and hence won't even try ('minimum deterrence")
d) They will settle for a Bismarckian policy of "appropriate" influence without seriously challenging the United States - something Hitler and Tojo could have done but didn't because they were too stupid - unlikely the gifted people running China.
d) Nuclear weapons make great power war impossible
e) Pushing the US out of Asia will cause Japan to militarize and nuclearize and China would rather not have that
f) China will not push Taiwan for fear of antagonizing the US
g) China's "focus remains on economic development and winning acceptance as a great power."

The trouble with this set of responses is that they do not really engage the core of the Realist argument, which is that when the hegemonic temptation arises it will not be resisted. For Brzezinski's take to be comforting it would be helpful if there was evidence that China was unwilling to challenge the status quo even when it has the means to do so. It seem to me that in the case of its military spending in recent years and its buildup on Taiwan, China has attempted to punch at or above its rising economic weight, not below it as Germany and Japan have done under US umbrellas in the postwar period. At its economic weight rises further, where is the evidence that it will not punch harder?

If you are convinced that the US will outpunch China for the next several decades (and I hope to return to predicting measures of national power soon) and you trust in the Bismarck scenario then this is grounds for believing that a serious conflict between China and the US is indeed unlikely. But even under the Bismarck scenario the Prussians (the Chinese) would still expect to be granted a few victories over the French (the Japanese?) and the Austrians (the Indians?) as Chinese power rises. For instance, the widely noted Goldman Sachs study suggested that China may overtake Japan in dollar GDP in a decade. Will the Chinese also resist the temptations that arise at that point? It would appear from (d) that Brzezinski believes that such a development will lead to a smooth transfer of influence from Japan to China with US acquiescence and then China will wait its turn for another decade and a half (again taking the Goldman numbers on dollar GDP as a basis for argument) till 2040. Then again from (e) and (f) it might appear that he feels that China will be "well behaved" regardless. More likely, he simply isn't taking the numbers that seriously.

On (d) Mearsheimer notes quite rightly that nuclear weapons do not eliminate security competitions - the cold war was all about this predicament.

Altogether, Brzezinski's responses don't quite add up to a convincing rebuttal. There do not appear to be purely realist/Realist grounds for optimism on China's rise in this debate.

When will China face up to its history?

2005-10-12T07:30:00.000+05:30

Dr Mohan Malik argues that authoritarian states have always used history as a tool to maintain political power. China’s Communist dictatorship has long used history to serve its foreign policy goals and to demonize “enemies”—domestic or foreign—as a way of distracting attention from arising from widening disparities and deepening socio-political contradictions in Chinese society and its own crimes against the Chinese people. Recent state-orchestrated anti-Japanese violent demonstrations bear echoes of the mass manipulation of the Cultural Revolution era and the siege of the Russian and Indian embassies by Mao’s Red Guards in the 1960s. The only difference being the replacement of Maoist slogans of the past with anti-Japanese watchwords (“Hate Japan”, “Kill all Japanese pigs”) and ultra-nationalist slogans. This is largely a consequence of the “patriotic education” [guoqing jiaoyu] initiated by Jiang Zemin following the Tiananmen massacre and the collapse of Communism in the Soviet bloc in 1989-90.

The Chinese are now using the “history issue” as a diplomatic card vis-à-vis Japan to deny their East Asian rival gaining an equal status at the UN. There is a general consensus that the Sino-Japanese tensions have little to do with the past and more to their future struggle for primacy in reshaping the global order. In a couple of decades it would be India’s turn to bear the brunt of Chinese resentment if India’s growing economic and military power is perceived as threatening China. If so, then the present state of China-Japan relations could well be the future of China-India relations. India’s Pakistan-watchers have long argued that to understand the depth of Pakistan’s hostility, animosity, and communal venom directed at India, one must read school history text books in Pakistan. The same is true of China as well if one wants to understand the roots of China’s animosity and perfidy towards India. However, none of India’s China-watchers has ever cared to undertake a critical content analysis of Chinese textbooks even though China has done the most to undermine India’s security through its strategic encirclement and nuclear proliferation strategies over the last six decades.

As a rising superpower, the Chinese government has a special responsibility to ensure that its citizens understand the world as it is, and are not motivated by feelings of resentment and victimhood. Nor can China be seen as a constructive player unless it abandons abandon the victim complex. If peace is to prevail in Asia, far-reaching changes to the school syllabus and the education system in China are needed. Complete article can be accessed here.

China-India Economic Engagement: Building Mutual Confidence

2005-10-11T08:54:00.000+05:30

Dr. Swaran Singh writes that with their annual GDP growth rates hitting respectively at 9.1 and 8.5 per cent for 2003 and at 9.5 and 6.9 per cent for 2004, China and India have since come to be recognized as the two largest as also the fastest growing economies of the 21st century. Thanks, however, to their colonial and cold war legacies, this economic boom had, for long, remained mutually exclusive exercise. It is only recently that their political initiatives at confidence building have begun to develop areas of mutual engagement which remains premised on their new mantra of mutual accommodation and mutual benefit. Their economic engagement as a result has since come to be the most reliable as also most agreeable instrument of China-India rapprochement so assiduously evolved during the last three decades or more.
Especially in the last few years, China-India economic engagement has picked up its own momentum with a steak-of-autonomy to say the least. From being once driven by their bold political initiatives, their economic engagement today symbolizes the most decisive force that promises to potentially circumscribe (and direct) their mutual policy initiatives. It is in this context that two sides have since come to appreciate how to use their economic engagement to deal with their long-standing political concerns and difficulties. Border trade, for one, has clearly earned the epithet of being an ideal approach to building atmospherics that can help resolve their boundary dispute, bilateral and regional dynamics. However, their new-found bonhomie remains as yet fragile and this calls for caution and serious planning on the part of both Beijing and New Delhi. Please see the complete monograph for details.

The CCP gathers and misses the point

2005-10-11T06:31:00.000+05:30

The opening of a Chinese Communist Party Congress is always attended with impressive pomp and circumstance, so much so that even quite astute observers are swept along. But as anyone who travels much in China or reads the Chinese press will know, what is asserted officially in Beijing is regularly proven false on the ground, elsewhere in China and even in Beijing itself. It is striking that this Congress is preoccupied with "strengthening" the position of President Hu Jintao and even considering who may be his successor. For the real issues in China are quite different. As this column, by yours truly, in the Washington Post suggests, the real issue for China is how she can democratize her political system in order to meet her most pressing need: for a legitimate government that has the confidence of her people, and which will therefore have genuine authority to address the country's many pressing problems.

Re-examining Mao's legacy

2005-10-09T22:37:00.000+05:30

I also write regularly for Commentary, one of America's most influential intellectual journals. Prompted by the appearance of a block busting new biography of Mao Zedong by the celebrated Chinese novelist Jung Chang, author of Wild Swans, and her husband, former New Left Review editor Jon Halliday, I have written the following article: "Mao Lives." Chang and Halliday estimate on the basis of good sources that Mao was responsible for the deaths of perhaps seventy million Chinese, in peacetime, through his purges and campaigns. This places him in the same league as Stalin and Hitler, as one of the greatest murderers of the bloody twentieth century. But I note that Mao is still respectable in a way that Hitler certainly is not: no one in his right mind would display a photo of the Fuhrer in his home or office, for example, or quote him in a speech. (Stalin of course was criticized by Khrushchev and removed from the Soviet pantheon). Why is Mao not recognized for what he was? Not least because he is still officially revered in China, where his embalmed body, in Tiananmen Square, is visited by thousands daily. Furthermore, the Chinese government and society, though greatly changed in many ways since Mao died in 1976, remains fundamentally Maoist in character: lacking governmental institutions, laws, rights, and so forth, and dominated entirely by personal politics. At a time when the rest of the world is starting to take note of India's remarkable democracy and freedom, now joined by economic development, reappraisal of Mao--long overdue in any case--becomes even more relevant to inhabitants of the subcontinent.

Propects for a democratic China

2005-10-09T22:29:00.000+05:30

The debate continues as to whether China's economic reforms will impel her towards democracy or whether her received Middle Kingdom complex will push her in the direction of national socialism. (see my review of Bruce Gilley's book - "China’s Democratic Future How It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead?" Columbia University Press, NY 2004). Certainly her bureaucratic culture is distant from any sense of equality, which is a general requisite for democratic functioning. This attitude transfers to foreign relations as well, and India has had two recent examples of a kind of imperialist arrogance: once when China's Mumbai Consul-General flouted all norms of diplomatic courtesy by publicly reprimanding India's Defence Minister for describing China's 1962 trans-Himalayan adventure as an 'invasion' instead of a defensive measure, which earned a rebuke from the MEA. China's Deputy Consul-General not to be outdone demanded the cancellation of a scheduled public meeting at a college because the speaker Tibetan monk-scholar Ven. Geshe Lhakdor was known to be close to the Dalai Lama, who is accused of using India as a base for anti-China activities. The organisers responded by reading the bureaucrat some elementary lessons in democratic processes.

US Debates the Rise of China, Once Again

2005-10-05T08:48:00.000+05:30

China is once again emerging as the top foreign policy priority of the US. Whether it's an adjustment in the yuan exchange rate or China's aggressive global energy diplomacy, every aspect related to China is getting closer scrutiny. After relegating China’s rise to a second-order priority for the last four years, the rise of China is again fueling debate among the foreign policy elites in the US. The latest issue of the Foreign Affairs magazine has a number of articles on the implications of a rapidly growing China. Most of the articles call for a serious attempt on the part of the US for shaping a cooperative bilateral relationship with China. But concerns are rising about the future trajectory of China’s rise and they are being increasingly articulated. It is incumbent upon India to take this debate seriously as its foreign policy will inevitably have to contend with an international environment shaped by the great-power politics of the twenty-first century involving China and the US.

China's Future: Brzezinski versus Mearsheimer

2005-10-05T05:22:00.000+05:30

There is a widespread narrative on China's future which forecasts a "peaceful rise" for her and a smooth integration into the global order - such as that is. This narrative typically points to China's history over the past couple of decades and to the technical quality of China's top leadership, often verified by the proponent at first hand during a recent Beijing visit.

A counter narrative invokes the lessons of history and expresses serious doubt that China's emergence will remain peaceful as her capacity to seek hegemony in Asia begins to roughly approach a quantum that might enable a run for it.

This counter narrative is clear in what it predicts but the "peaceful rise" camp is a big tent. It includes people in the US who feel that China will accept the current security architecture in East Asia going into the foreseeable future as she will be unable to challenge it, some who can hardly wait for the US to be pushed out of Asia (the Chinese leadership itself) and still others who seem to vaguely hope that China will evolve into a larger version of Germany or Japan.

Sorting out the merits of these two opposing narratives is a task of considerable importance for all concerned with Asia's (and India's) future such as those contributing to this blog. For today I will content myself by drawing the attention of our readers to an actual debate on this topic between two heavyweights in the American debate: Zbigniew Brzezinski and John Mearsheimer at the Carnegie Endowment last year which is available in summary form here.

Tackling Income Disparities and Tightening Grip over Media: China's Communists in a Quandary

2005-10-01T08:57:00.000+05:30

Finally, the Communist Party in China seems to have woken up to the yawning income disparities between China’s rural and urban areas. So long, the Chinese government has been extremely successful in hiding their socio-economic problems behind the dazzling rates of economic growth. As reported in this piece in the Washington Post, the Communists seem to be worried now about the impact of growing socio-economic inequality on political stability. In other words, the Communist Party is concerned about its own longevity in power if the present socio-economic trends continue. The Communist Party is also trying hard to control the flow of information to the people of China, the latest being its attempt to limit the news and other information available to internet users. It remains to be seen how long this two-pronged strategy of managing economic growth more equitably and further tightening of political control will serve the Communists in China.

China Takes the Lead In Asia-Pacific

2005-09-25T06:20:00.000+05:30

China’s increasing role on the world stage was once again felt this past week when a nuclear deal was brokered between North Korea and the US under China’s leadership. Charles Krauthammer in his recent article in the Washington Post argues that China’s leadership role cannot be understated and probably it’s the beginning of China’s diplomatic dominance in Asia-pacific. If this is true then it's implications for the states in the region, especially for India, should not be underetimated.

China-Japan Tensions

2005-08-18T06:12:00.000+05:30

The growing tension noticeable recently in China-Japan relations has been traced by Professor Dipak Basu of Nagasaki University, mainly to differences over Taiwan. (Expanding Empire I and II in Statesman 8th and 9th August 2005).

Describing China as an imperial power extending into Tibet, Turkistan,Manchuria, Mongolia and more recently the Spratleys, Taiwan remains an as yet unachieved imperial target. None of these societies have been 'part of the Motherland' in any meaningful sense, and Basu avers that China can claim undisputed rule over Taiwan only for a period of eight years, from1887-1895. Japan's refusal to accept Taiwan as part of China, her recognition of Taiwanese independence he places at the root of China's animosity towards that country as she readies to stake her claim to Taiwan, perhaps even militarily.

By contrast we may see that the Indian government has never recognised Taiwan and by and large tried to placate China. A few years back however, during the Narsimha Rao regime, India opened a trading consulate in Taipeh (earlier she traded through an Indian representing Taiwan in Delhi), and even more recently upgraded the post somewhat by appointing a serving foreign officer in place of a retire. Despite her public pusillanimity with regard to China, the Indian government seems to be strengthening her ties and alliances with Japan, South Korea and the US, and hastening slowly towards a less vulnerable position. However, the conduct of the Himalayan negotiations leave much to be desired, andthe protracted sell-out over Tibet, a kind of attenuated retreat from both reality and principle, is indeed a tragedy and strategic surrender of Himalayan proportions.

Rural Unrest in China

2005-08-01T16:51:00.000+05:30

A front page article addressing rural unrest in the People's Daily is a clear sign of concern. The Western media to their credit have picked it up. But the story sits oddly with the other news this morning, of new reassurances by the army that it is not "expansionist," coupled with more warnings to Taiwan; the opening of "strategic dialogue" with the United States; further attempts to arrive at a settlement of the North Korean issue, and the arrest of a top state enterprise official in Guangdong.

These stories show the fundamental problem faced by the unelected Chinese government, of lack of domestic support even at a time when it seems more successful than ever on the international front.

A few weeks ago the overseas Chinese newspapers were reporting that participation in unrest or demonstrations had risen from 70,000 perhaps a decade ago to more than 3,000,000 in recent years. Rioting followed a basketball game in Beijing recently. Two reasons lie behind this: first, there is more and more about which to be angry, and second, the people no longer fear the authorities as they did. Corruption, poverty, and vast income inequality are obvious to all, as is the arbitrariness of the government. Occasionally armed thugs are set on rural demonstrators, but payoffs and settlement are also common.The communists will remember their own foundation epic: how a government that did not serve the people was overthrown when the people rose up. That may not be exactly how it happened, but that is how they think it happened--and they don't want to take any chances.

Lack of mention of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao's ostensible greater concern for the ordinary people is striking. Instead we have a contradictory and harsh note: all of these obvious pathologies are in fact normal, a sign of healthy development, and don't dare protest.

My own hunch is that the army's influence is increasing, and although this manifesto is not issued in their name, it was they, and not the government, that reassured the world they were not expansionist--and threatened Taiwan. But I wonder whether, if it came to the crunch, the army will really support a government that crushed obviously justified protests by the fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, and children of its own men? anw

Why Did Secretary Rice Miss APEC?

2005-08-01T00:25:00.000+05:30

I know that Asians are puzzled that US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice failed to turn up at the recent Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group meeting in Korea, sending instead Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick. As an American, I am puzzled too.

Dr Rice is of course a Soviet specialist, something not in much demand these days. But she may have inherited the mind set of senior Soviet era foreign policy specialists, such as Mr Kissinger and Mr Brzezinski, that stresses the "big issues." (Asked why he never visited key ally Australia Mr Kissinger said, "we have never had trouble with Australia"). So perhaps Dr Rice thinks that Moscow, Beijing, and so forth are the really important places in foreign policy.

If so, she is absolutely incorrect. From an American point of view, Japan is the key ally in Northeast Asia and Australia in the far south. The ASEAN countries, who will feel the sting of this slight very deeply, are home to half a billion people, mostly having respectable standards of living and education, some having democratic regimes, and all sitting on the most important sea and land lines of communication in Asia. They need much more attention, not less.

Robert Zoellick, an accomplished trade negotiator, for all his strengths, is not the man for that mission. Trade is important, but so too is security, not his strong suit.

Then of course there is India. It remains to be seen whether the brave start made by Mr Bush and PM Singh will be pursued. But the buzz in DC is that Ms Rice is yielding tactically to the bad guys and ignoring the good guys. APEC would bear that out.

I am never one to be pessimistic. But in retrospect the US diplomacy of the 1970s got a great deal wrong. It paid no attention to the key issue of domestic political systems, instead going for a countries are weights to be balanced in pans approach--only to see one weight, the USSR, disappear, creating problems about which few had thought at all, and its counterweight, China, emerged unbalanced as a regional destabilizer. And, oh yes, wasn't India supposed to collapse in a whirlpool of ethnic cleansing, regional division, misgovernment, and poverty? This is what happens when instead of attending to detail, national security advisers or secretaries of state attempt to focus on the (inevitably misidentified) "big issues." I smell it in the air again. anw

Washington Post dissects US China problems

2005-07-31T19:58:00.000+05:30

A friend has forwarded to me an article by James McGregor from today's Washington Post that provides a good survey of the current strengths and weaknesses of Washington and Beijing in diplomacy and intelligence. A similar comparison for India and beijing would be very useful.

Nothing in this essay surprises me, for all we are seeing today is yet another instance of patterns of behavior by both countries that have been clear since the turn of the last century. China, being fundamentally weak, uses manipulation both of other governments--look at how she hoodwinked Pandit Nehru--and of international institutions such as the UN, WTO, etc. to achieve her aims. Lawyers spin words into real assets: money, recognition, sovereignty, etc. and one stream of Chinese diplomacy has recognized that this is an easier way to achieve ends than is war.

The United States has reciprocated with an intentional, self-renewing unwillingness simply to gather and establish the facts about China--Qing China, Nationalist China, or Communist China. This is a complex phenomenon, driven in part by massive business interests today, but also reflecting a long standing psychological pattern. One might compare our decades long policy toward India, of moral genuflection, much talk about shared values (which are real, of course, as is not the case with the communist rulers of China) and a complete unwillingness to come to grips with India's problems. In each case, this is a form of condescension

What the article suggests, and I endorse, is first that Washington somehow make an unblinking and unpoliticized assessment not only of China but of the likely reactions of her neighbors to her current policies. Then I would suggest that we identify as our real friends the other states in Asia with whom we share belief in freedom and democracy. Such a community--proposed recently by Ross Terrill in The Australian and Ellen Bork in the Financial Times--would rest securely on basic values. The present US-China relation rests on nothing very clear and is sustained chiefly by a variety of often conflicting government and domestic in

Becker and Posner on China

2005-04-25T05:30:00.000+05:30

Gary Becker and Richard Posner, two of the finest economic minds thinking about general issues have started a blog. Their recent posts include some thoughts on China's economic future and whether linear projections of its current trajectory are warranted. Both argue for considerable scepticism. The posts by Becker and Posner are worth reading in the original, the arguments range too widely to permit of an easy summary here.

Hu Jintao and Reform

2005-04-25T04:39:00.000+05:30

Today's Washington Post reports that China's Hu Jintao has no interest in reforming the Chinese political system, let alone democratizing it. In recent months he has arrested writers, fired an academic critic, called for increased "ideological education" in universities and taken "steps to close regulatory loopholes that have allowed independent, nongovernmental organizations to develop in China" which indicates a hostility to any autonomy on the part of Chinese civil society. When you add to this the passage of the "anti-secession" law aimed at Taiwan and the recent bullying of Japan, the picture that emerges is indeed that of an "ultimate product of the system" as described in the piece by a "party academic"(!). To those of us familiar with Hu's uncompromisingly repressive record as Party Secretary in Tibet, this does not come as a surprise, but it is useful to see a new narrative which corrects the fan mail Hu collected in the aftermath of the SARS crisis as well as the more general optimistic narrative that views a "peaceful evolution" of the Chinese political system as an inevitability. I critiqued an example of the latter here.